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Design of Truth Telling Quantity Discount Contract
under Information Asymmetry
Weng Ming1, Ying Li1*
1
Guangxi University of Finance & Economics, Nanning
Abstract: Supply chains are often in an environment where the demand is affected by the retailer’s sales effort and the
supplier has no accurate information about the retailer’s cost. In this situation, the retailer’s action of distorting his cost
information could damage the efficiency of the supply chain. In order to reduce the resulted impairment, the problem of how
to coordinate the retailer’s action using quantity discount contract is studied based on principal-agent theory. The way of how
to determine the parameters of the contract is provided. The contract offers more preferential wholesale price to the retailer
with lower cost, so that the retailer has the incentive to reveal his private cost information truthfully and the efficiency of the
supply chain is improved. Numerical example shows how the parameters in the quantity discount contract change with the
retailer’s cost. The impact of the contracts upon the supply chain member’s expected profit is also demonstrated. The results
support the conclusion drew from the theoretical analysis.

Keywords: information asymmetry1, quantity discount2, sales effort3, adverse selection4, principal-agent theory5

1.

INTRODUCTION
Lots of cases in the reality have fully proven that the importance of information in supply chain

management (SCM) [1]. Nevertheless, information asymmetry is a widespread phenomenon in supply chain, and
no enterprise can get complete information in suppler chain actually, which brings two difficulties to enterprises
in business decision making: one is lack of information; the other is hard to distinguish the authenticity of
information. This leads to the failure of the transaction among all participators, or poor transaction effect even
they can conclude the transaction.
The academia perceives this problem. To eliminate the negative effect of information asymmetry, some
scholars studies the incentive mechanism of how to strengthen the information sharing in supply chain [2]-[7].
These research findings can broaden the information source of enterprises effectively, and help them solve the
predicament of lack of information. However, these researches are based on a key assumption that is the sharing
information is authentic while it comes from the superiority of information owner, without considering the
possibility that the superiority of information owner misstate information. Certainly, even the obtained
information is inaccurate, it still helps the inferior of information owners diminishes the uncertainty of
information, and brings them certain benefit. Nevertheless, it causes the supply chain system can’t achieve the
optimal state. Hence, it is not enough that if the incentive mechanism can only ensure all participators to ‘tell’
(that is willing to share information), and can’t ensure they ‘tell truth’ (that is willing to share the authentic
private information).
Actually, the possibility that the superiority of information owners misstate information is greater than the
inferior because they can obtain benefit usually while they do so

[8]

. Other scholars try to solve these issues

about ‘misstated information’ by using the principal-agent theory. The superiority of information owner is called
principal, and the other side is called agent. Corbett studies the contract design problems in the model of ‘order
quantity/reorder point’ under information asymmetry [9]. Corbett and Groote solve the optimal quantity discount
*
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policy under the situation that the retailer’s cost information is asymmetric

[10]

. Corbett, Zhou and Tang

respectively investigate the single wholesale price contract, two-part linear contract and two-part nonlinear
contract under the complete information and asymmetric information about retailer’s cost [11]. Based on different
assumption, Ha does similar discussion about contract design problem in supply chain with asymmetric
information about retailer’s cost, and finds the optimal policy that vendor prohibits retailers with high cost
participate in supply chain

[12]

. Özer and Wei consider the capacity decision problems in supply chain under

asymmetric forecast information, and suggest two contracts ensuring reliable forecast information sharing

[13]

.

Hansheng Suo and Yihui Jin reveal the optimal buy back strategy for vendor, and conclude that it is impossible
to design a contract which makes supply chain achieves cooperative situation with complete information if
contract designer doesn’t understand the retailer’s cost structure [14]. The research of Burnetas, Gilbert and Smith
demonstrates how vendor utilizes the quantity discount to coordinate the inventory decision of the downstream
buyers who own more demand information

[15]

. The main purpose of these researches is to design contract

properly, so that the agents in supply chain are not only willing to ‘tell’, but also ‘tell truth’, and then improve
the efficiency of the supply chain.
All the above researches on ‘misstated information’ don’t consider the situation that demand is affected by
the level of sales effort. Sales effort refers to a series of actions used to stimulate demand by retailers, e.g. hiring
more sales people, strengthening the training of sales people, increasing advertising investment, etc. Considering
the cost of all these actions, besides the order quantity, retailer’s sales effort should be coordinated in contract
designing. Currently, all researches about coordinating both order quantity and sales effort don’t take it into
account that the retailer’s cost information is asymmetric [16]-[18].
This paper uses the principal-agent theory to study the designing problem of quantity discount contract
under the situation that is vendor doesn’t understand retailer’s cost and the demand is affected by retailer’s sales
effort. Assuming the contract is offered by vendor who is at a disadvantage. In this case, retailer may ask for
more preferential contract terms such as lower wholesale price through misstating high cost and narrow margin,
so that damage the efficiency of the supply chain. This paper tries to figure out the problems of how to
determine the parameters of the quantity discount contract to avoid retailer misstate their cost, and set proper
order quantity and sales effort to improve the efficiency of the supply chain.
2.

BASIC Model

2.1 Symbols and assumptions
This paper studies a two-tier decentralized decision supply chain system including a single vendor and a
single retailer. Vendor offers contract to retailer in a selling cycle, while retailer orders a certain quantity of
products and put a certain sales effort to promote it in market to maximize its effectiveness. In order to explain
conveniently, authors stipulate the symbols of the model as follow:
p : The retail price of commodity in market determined by market;

q : The quantity of commodity ordered by retailer from vendor;
c : The production cost of commodity of vendor per unit;

 : Retailer’s sales effort, and  ≥ 1 ;
CE : The cost function of retailer’s sales effort, and satisfies: CE (1) = 0 , CE′ ( ) > 0 , and CE′′ ( ) > 0 ;

 : The inventory holding cost spent by retailer on commodity per unit (except wholesale price);
s : The residual value of unsold commodity per unit;

T : The transfer payment from retailer to vendor;

 s : Vendor’s expected profit;
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 r : Retailer’s expected profit;
Π : The expected profit of supply chain system;
The ‘ ∗’ and ‘ SB ’ marked on the upper right corner of symbols represent the optimal situation and
suboptimal situation respectively in this paper.
D

is a continuous random variable, and its distribution function and probability density function are

H and h . D is the market demand of product affected by sales effort, D =  D , and its distribution function
is F while its probability density function is f .
In addition, the other assumptions are as follow:
① D > 0 , H (0) = 0 , H is differentiable and strict increasing;
② Let F ( y |  ) be the distribution of demand with specified  , and the demand is stochastically
increasing with effort, namely,

∂F ( y |  )
< 0;
∂

③ The total cost spent on commodity per unit in supply chain is more than its residual value ( so the
commodity hoarded in supply chain must be sold, otherwise it couldn’t make profit), but less than the retail
price of commodity ( so it must obtain profit when the commodity in supply chain are sold), namely,
s < c + < p ;
④ Both vendor and retailer are risk-neutral;
⑤ Either party must fulfill the contract once is it signed.
2.2 Comparison benchmark: the optimal contract under complete information
According to the regulation of quantity discount contract, the wholesale price of commodity given by
vendor is w . Hence, the transfer payment given from retailer to vendor is:

T = wq

(1)

The expected net profit function of retailer is:

 r net = ( p − w −  )q −( p − s ) ∫ F ( y |  )dy − CE ( )
q

(2)

0

The expected net profit function of vendor is:

 s net = (w − c)q

(3)

The expected gross profit and expected net profit of supply chain in a selling season are as follow
respectively:

Π gross (q,  ,  ) = pq − ( p − s ) ∫ F ( y |  )dy
q

(4)

0

Π net (q,  , ) = ( p − c −  )q − ( p − s ) ∫ F ( y |  )dy − CE ( )
q

(5)

0

Assuming Π net (q,  ,  ) is unimodal and can reach the maximum with limited  (if q − ∫ F ( y |  )dy
q

0

increases quickly enough with  and CE ( ) is insufficiently convex, then the infinite sales effort may be the
optimal, but it is not accord with reality).
According to the equation (5), it is known that the optimal order quantity and the level of sales effort of the
whole supply chain can be solved by the following equation:
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q ∂F ( y |  )

dy − CE′ ( ) = 0
 − ( p − s ) ∫0
∂

 p − c −  − ( p − s ) F (q |  ) = 0

(6)

In order to simplify discussion, let CE ( ) = a( − 1) 2 , D ~ U [0, Dmax ] , and it is found that:

 ∗ ( ) = 1 +
q ∗ ( ) = (1 +

Dmax ( p − c −  ) 2
4a
p−s

(7)

D max ( p − c −  ) 2
p − c −
) D max
4a
p−s
p−s

(8)

Vendor only needs to allocate a portion of expected net profit of supply chain which equals to  r min to
retailer, and then it could satisfy his participation constraint and coordinate with supply chain, so that the
following equation is tenable:

 r net (q∗ ( ),  ∗ ( ),  ) =  r min

(9)

Therefore, it is easy to determine the wholesale price of the optimal quantity discount contract, which is:

w∗ ( ) = p −  −

3.

∗
2
( p − s )q∗ ( ) a ( ( ) − 1) +  r min
−
2 ∗ ( ) Dmax
q∗ ( )

(10)

The SUBOPTIMAL CONTRACT RESULTING IN ‘TELL TRUTH’ UNDER THE ADVERSE
SELECTION
3.1 The derivation of the incentive compatibility constraint
This paper assumes vendor could observe retailer’s sales effort and compensate the corresponding cost to

retailer, without considering the information asymmetry about retailer’s sales effort. In some cases, this
assumption is tenable. For example, vendor easily understands how much effort retailer uses to advertise on
media, or how many shelves retailer arranges for products and so on. The following discussion is about how to
design the quantity discount contract when vendor doesn’t know retailer’s cost  . Assuming retailer knows his
accurate cost, but vendor doesn’t know it. However, vendor knows the distribution of retailer’s cost  , which is
the continuous distribution in the intervals of [ ,  ] , and the distribution function is G ( ) while the density
function is g ( ) , in addition, the monotone hazard rate condition is tenable, namely,

∂  G ( ) 

 ≥ 0 . For the
∂  g ( ) 

reason of simplification, authors assume   U [ ,  ] .
In this case, if adopting the primary optimal contract, the wholesale price obtained by retailer is w∗ (%)
where the order quantity placed by retailer is q∗ (%) and its sales effort is  ∗ (%) , when retailer reports its cost
is % . The actual expected net profit of supply chain system is

Π net (q∗ (%),  ∗ (%),  )

(that

is Π net (q∗ (%),  ∗ (%), %) + (%−  )q∗ (%) ). It is easily calculated that the expected net profit obtained by retailer is
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 r net (q∗ (%),  ) =  r min + (%−  )q∗ (%) based on the equation (10). Obviously, retailer whose actual cost is 
can obtain higher profit through reports a higher false cost %>  . To design a contract which makes retailer
reports his real cost, the key factor is to get the incentive compatibility constraint to make agent’s profit obtained
by ‘tell truth’ is greater than or equal to the profit obtained by misstating cost.
 ( ) is defined as the payment to retailer, including two parts: the compensation to retailer’s cost and the
portion divided from the net profit of supply chain system to retailer, and under the complete information,

 ( ) =  r min +  q( ) + CE ( ( )) , but ,under the adverse selection,  ( ) =  r min + U ( ) +  q( ) + CE ( ( )) .
In the equation of ( ) , U ( ) is the information rent delivered from vendor to retailer initiatively to let retailer
‘tell truth’. If and only if U ( ) ≥ 0 is tenable, the expected net profit obtained by retailer is  r min at least, and
that can ensure retailer is like to cooperate with supply chain. Therefore, the condition U ( ) ≥ 0 is the
participation constraint condition to retailer.

)
If retailer reports his cost is %but his actual cost is  , he will be required to place an order of q(%

and set

his sales effort level as  (%) , and his net profit is (%) −  q(%) − CE ( (%)) . So the first-order condition of the
optimal selection of retailer with cost of % is ′(%) −  q′(%) − CE′ ( (%)) ′(%) = 0 . In order to let revealing
real cost information become the optimal selection to retailer, for arbitrary  , it must have the equation of

 ′( ) −  q′( ) − CE′ ( ( )) ′( ) = 0 .It is equivalent to  ( ) −  q( ) − CE ( ( )) ≥  (%) −  q(%) − CE ( (%)) ,
so that it is the incentive compatibility constraint to retailer. The incentive compatibility constraint can be shown
as U ′( ) = − q ( ) , because U ′( ) =  ′( ) − q ( ) −  q′( ) − CE′ ( ( )) ′( ) .
The second-order condition of retailer’s decision problem must be tenable where %=  , namely, it must
have  ′′( ) −  q′′( ) − CE′′ ( ( ))( ′( )) 2 − CE′ ( ( )) ′′( ) ≤ 0 . The derivation of the first-order condition

 ′( ) −  q′( ) − CE′ ( ( )) ′( ) = 0 is ′′( ) − q′( ) −  q′′( ) − CE′′ ( ( ))( ′( ))2 − CE′ ( ( )) ′′( ) = 0 , so the
second=order condition can be written as q′( ) ≤ 0 .
3.2 Determining the parameters of the suboptimal quantity discount contract
After the incentive compatibility and participation constraint are obtained, the difficult faced by vendor is
to set proper value of U ( ) to let retailer with cost  ‘tell truth’, meanwhile, don’t need to pay too much. The
allocation of the gross profit of supply chain carries out as following steps: firstly, the value of cq ( ) +  s min is
divided from expected gross profit to pay vendor’s cost and his reserved profit; and then the value of  q ( )

+CE ( ( )) +  r min + U ( ) is divided to pay retailer’s cost (including inventory holding cost and the cost of
sales effort), retailer’s reserved cost and information rent; finally, the residual of expected gross profit (this
residual of the expected gross profit is only solved according to the random demand D )is assigned to vendor.
This is denoted as:

 (q( ),  ( ),  ) = ( p − c −  )q( ) − ( p − s) ∫

q ( )

0

F ( y |  ( ))dy − CE ( ( )) − (U ( ) +  r min +  s min )

(11)
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The retailer’s cost  is a random variable to vendor, so the residual of the expected gross profit to vendor is
the function of a two dimensions random variable <D,  > . Combined with the incentive compatibility and
participation constraint in the preceding section, the optimization problem of vendor can be described as follow:

P:



max E  = ∫  (q( ),  ( ),  ) g ( )d

{U , q ,  }



s.t. IC U ′( ) = −q( )
q′( ) ≤ 0
IR U ( ) ≥ 0
The IC in P ensures every retailer with different kind of cost reveal his cost information truthfully. IR can
be simplified as U ( ) ≥ 0 and compacted, namely, U ( ) = 0 . According to the integral of U ′( ) = − q ( ) ,


and use the condition U ( ) = 0 , it is found that: U ( ) = ∫ q SB ( z )dz .


Refer to the method in [19], the equation about q ( ) is:

( p − c −  − ( p − s ) F (q( ) |  ( ))) g ( ) − G ( ) = 0
And then solve the first-order condition about  ( ) , it is found that:
( p − s )(q ( )) 2
− 2a( ( ) − 1) = 0
2 Dmax ( ( )) 2

(12)

(13)

Combing the assumption condition with the simultaneous equations (12) and (13), it is found that:

 SB ( ) = 1 +

q SB ( ) = Dmax (1 +

Dmax ( p − c +  − 2 ) 2
4a ( p − s )

(14)

Dmax ( p − c +  − 2 ) 2 p − c +  − 2
)(
)
4a ( p − s )
p−s

(15)

The following is to determine the wholesale price of the suboptimal quantity discount contract. Let:

 r net (q SB ( ),  SB ( ), ) = U ( ) +  r min

(16)

And then it is obtained:


SB
2
SB
( p − s )q SB ( ) a ( ( ) − 1) + ∫ q ( z )dz +  r min
SB
w ( ) = p −  −
−
2 SB ( ) Dmax
q SB ( )

4.

(17)

NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
This section reveals the rule of how parameters in contract change with the retailer’s cost by means of

numerical analysis, and the influence of the optimal and suboptimal contract upon the expected profit of vendor,
retailer and the whole supply chain system under different situation, and point out the corresponding meaning of
management. Let   U [ ,  ] , the parameters in model are p=70, s=5, c=10,  = 5 ,  = 15 ,

 s min =  r min = 103 , Dmax = 104 and a=104.
The figure 1 demonstrates the relationship of wholesale price changed with retailer’s cost in the optimal and
suboptimal contract. It is noticed that the monotonicity of the wholesale price’s function curves in both contracts
show completely opposite. Vendor only needs to let the wholesale price be the value that retailer can only obtain
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reserved value under complete information. Therefore, it means
that the profit space gained from the retailer with low cost has
great potential, for this reason, vendor would set a higher
wholesale price to gain this part of profit. On the contrary, to those
retailers’ with high cost, vendor would like to set a lower
wholesale price to ensure they gain reserved profit. Consequently,
the wholesale price in the optimal contract decrease with the
increasing of the retailer’s cost. Retailer with low cost misstates a
higher cost to obtain lower wholesale price and decreases his order
quantity and sales effort when the reverse selection exists. But the
suboptimal contract is quiet different, its wholesale price increases
with the increasing of retailer’s cost, which means vendor delivers
actively a part of profit (that is information rent) to retailer with
low cost to let retailer ‘tell truth’, and reveal his cost information
truthfully and recover his order quantity and sales effort. The
retailer’s cost is lower, the incentive intensity needed by retailer is
greater, and retailer gets more information rent.
The figure 2 shows the relationship of retailer’s order
quantity changed with its cost in the optimal and suboptimal
contracts. Both order quantity in the optimal and suboptimal
contract decrease with the increasing of retailer’s cost. The order
quantity of other types of retailers in the suboptimal contract is
lower than in the optimal contract, except the retailer with the
lowest

cost.

Because

the

value

of

information

rent



is U ( ) = ∫ q SB ( z )dz , the order quantity of retailer is larger,


more information rent needed to pay by vendor. Vendor could decrease the information rent delivered to retailer
through reducing retailer’s order, so the suboptimal contract
would make a downward distortion to the order quantity of
retailer, which presents a tradeoff between the efficiency loss
and rent payment faced by vendor.
The figure 3 displays the relationship of retailer’s sales effort
changed with retailer’s cost in the optimal and suboptimal
contracts. It can be seen that both sales effort decrease with the
increasing of retailer’s cost in the optimal and suboptimal
contracts. And the sales effort of other types of retailers in the
suboptimal contract is lower than in the optimal contract, except
the retailer with the lowest cost. It is natural, because the order
quantity of the retailer with higher cost is distorted downward, as a
result, there is no need for retailer to put too much sales effort.
The figure 4 reveals the expected residual profit obtained by vendor based on the rule of the suboptimal
contract. It can be seen that vendor still obtains positive expected residual profit after fulfill the payment of the cost
compensation, reserved profit and information rent to every participator. Hence, the profit space of the supply
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chain is great enough in this example. The downward distortion of the order quantity and sales effort of retailer
would not cause the profit of the supply chain decrease too much to fulfill the above payment, so it is unnecessary
to consider the situation that prohibiting the retailer with high cost to participate the supply chain. And the figure 5
shows that while retailer with a cost of  misstate his cost as %, his expected profit increase with the increasing
of the misstated value (since

∂ r net
> 0 ), as a result, all retailers with different kinds of cost would report his cost
∂%

is  .

The figure 6 displays that under the suboptimal contract, the
expected net profit of retailer with different kinds of cost can reach
the maximum if and only if they reveal their cost information
truthfully (the highest point of every expected net profit curve is
pointed by every arrows in figure 6, consequently, they wouldn’t
misstate information. That presents the suboptimal quantity
discount contract designed in this paper is the mechanism which
let agent ‘tell truth’ indeed.
The figure 7 shows the different expected profit obtained by
vendor adopting two contracts respectively under the reverse
selection. If vendor offers the optimal contract to retailers, then
retailer with different kind of cost will declare his cost is  , so
that the expected profit of vendor wouldn’t change. And if
vendor offer the suboptimal contract to retailer, then retailer
would report his kind truthfully. Because retailer’s cost is higher,
the distorted level of his order quantity and sales effort made by
the suboptimal contract is more. When retailer’s cost is very
high, the performance of the suboptimal contract would be
worse than the optimal contract. But the suboptimal contract can
effectively minimize the negative impact brought by the reverse
selection on the whole. The zone A and B in figure 7 present the
increase and decrease of the expected profit caused by the
suboptimal contract. Obviously, the area of zone A is larger than
zone B, so adopting the suboptimal contract is a better supply
chain coordination policy to improve the expected profit of
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vendor under information asymmetry.

5.

CONCLUSIONS
It is unsure that every member in supply chain shares accurate information even an efficient information

and communication channel built among them. Because misstating information could bring benefit to the
superiority of information owner in some cases, but damage other. It happens when vendor doesn’t understand
retailer’s cost. To solve this problem, authors found a quantity discount contract that ensures retailer ‘tell truth’
and reveal his real cost by using principal-agent theory and analyzed the motivation of misstating information of
retailer, under the environment that the demand is affected by the sales effort level of retailer. Although, based
on the regulation of this contract, vendor pays a certain information rent to retailer, and the order quantity and
sales effort level of retailer with higher cost is less than the optimal value. This contract significantly increases
the expected profit of vendor on the whole, so it is effective. The result of numeric analysis supports this
conclusion as well.
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